Politics and Society in Northern Ireland, 1949 - 1993:

Chapter 17:

I. Northern Ireland's Status After 1949

Declaration of the Republic of Ireland: In April 1949, the Irish Free State declared itself a Republic, leaving the British Commonwealth and severing all ties with the King of England.

Strengthening of the Union: This declaration, contrary to what some nationalists might have hoped, actually strengthened the connection between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.

Ireland Act (1949): In response to the Republic's declaration, the British Labour Government, led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee, passed the Ireland Act (1949). This Act guaranteed that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom unless the Parliament in Belfast voted against the Union. Given the large Unionist majority in the Northern Ireland Parliament, this made separation highly unlikely.

Unionist Insecurity: Despite their strong position, Unionists in Northern Ireland never felt entirely secure, perceiving constant internal and external threats to their rule.

II. A Divided Society

Unionist Rule: Since 1921, the six counties of Northern Ireland had been continuously ruled by the Unionist Party, under the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act (1920) which introduced partition.

Religious and Political Divide: Northern Ireland was deeply divided along religious and political lines.

Protestants (Unionists): Formed about two-thirds of the population (66%). They were generally descended from Scottish and English settlers, were mostly Presbyterians or Church of Ireland (Anglicans), and were fiercely loyal to the Union with Britain. They controlled the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Special Constabulary (B Specials). They benefited from the union due to Belfast's industrial prosperity, fearing economic decline under a nationalist government.

Catholics (Nationalists): Comprised one-third of the population (33%). They generally identified as Irish, considered themselves discriminated against, and desired a united Ireland. Many refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state and boycotted its institutions.

Protestant Supremacy: The Unionist government, particularly under Prime Minister Basil Brooke (Lord Brookeborough), pursued a policy of Protestant supremacy. They viewed Catholics with deep suspicion, leading to widespread discrimination.
Discrimination in Employment: Catholics faced significant discrimination in employment, especially in public sector jobs. A stark example was the Londonderry Corporation, where Protestants held 100% of higher-level jobs despite Catholics forming the majority of the population.

Discrimination in Housing: Allocation of public housing was often biased, with Unionist councils frequently favoring Protestant families, even if it meant overcrowding in Catholic areas. This also served to manipulate electoral boundaries.
Discrimination in Local Government: Electoral boundaries were gerrymandered to ensure Unionist control of local councils, even in areas with Catholic majorities. For example, in Derry, Catholics formed 61% of the population but held only 8 of 20 council seats due to gerrymandering. The franchise was also restricted to ratepayers, excluding many poorer Catholics.

III. The IRA's Border Campaign (1956-1962)

Renewed Violence: In the mid-1950s, the IRA renewed its campaign of violence, focusing on attacks along the border with the Republic of Ireland. This was partly a response to the continued partition of Ireland and the perceived stagnation of the nationalist political approach.

Objective: The IRA aimed to bring down the Northern Ireland state through a series of military attacks and to ultimately achieve a united Ireland.
Tactics: The campaign involved raids on RUC barracks, bombings of bridges and customs posts, and ambushes. The IRA operated from bases within the Republic, using hit-and-run tactics.

Failure and Public Opinion: The Border Campaign ultimately failed. It gained little support from the Catholic population in Northern Ireland, who largely rejected violence. Many IRA members were arrested or killed, and their limited numbers could not sustain the campaign. The campaign also put pressure on the government of the Republic of Ireland, which introduced internment without trial against IRA members.
Casualties: By the end of the campaign in 1962, eight RUC officers and ten IRA volunteers had been killed.

IV. The Close of the Brookeborough Era

Relative Stability: With the exception of the Border Campaign, the 1950s and early 1960s were largely characterized by political stability in Northern Ireland. The IRA campaign posed little real threat to the state's security.

Missed Opportunity: Brookeborough's government failed to use this period of stability to encourage greater Catholic participation in state institutions. Instead, Unionists maintained their suspicion of Catholics and adhered to the policy of Protestant supremacy.

Economic Challenges: The greatest difficulties for Brookeborough's government were economic, particularly high unemployment rates. Trade unionists protested the government's record, and in the 1962 general election, the Unionist Party lost votes and seats to the Northern Ireland Labour Party.

Brookeborough's Resignation: Growing discontent among Unionists, coupled with the electoral setback, led leading members of the Unionist Party to compel Lord Brookeborough to resign in March 1963. He was succeeded by Captain Terence O'Neill, the Minister of Finance.

Seeds of Future Conflict: Despite the calm, the underlying issues of discrimination and division laid the groundwork for the future outbreak of the Troubles in 1969.

Chapter 18:

I. Captain Terence O'Neill's Premiership (1963-1969)

Background and Aims: O'Neill, a privileged Unionist, became Prime Minister in March 1963, succeeding Lord Brookeborough. Unlike his predecessors, he aimed to modernize Northern Ireland economically and socially for the benefit of all communities, including Catholics. His principal aims were to make Northern Ireland economically stronger and to "build bridges between the two traditions."

Economic Transformation: O'Neill believed in economic planning and attracting foreign investment.
He established the Economic Council, Ulster Office in London, and a Ministry of Economic Development.
New industries included Michelin, Courtaulds, and Ford.
He supported the construction of a new university at Coleraine (Magee College was bypassed) and a new city, Craigavon.
However, new industries often located in the east, exacerbating unemployment in the west (especially Derry), and he failed to control powerful industrialists like Cameron, who opposed investment in west of Bann.
Traditional industries like linen and shipbuilding declined, leading to high unemployment, especially among Catholic men, who faced discrimination.

Reaching Out to Catholics: O'Neill attempted to improve relations with the Catholic community. He visited Catholic schools, met with Catholic Church leaders (including Cardinal William Conway), and relaxed some restrictions on the flying of the Irish tricolour. His most significant gesture was inviting Taoiseach Seán Lemass to Stormont in 1965, followed by a reciprocal visit to Dublin. These meetings were the first between Northern Ireland and Republic leaders in over 40 years.

II. Reactions to O'Neill's Policies

Positive Reactions:
Republic of Ireland: Lemass welcomed the meetings as an end to a "cold war" and a step towards improved North-South relations.
Northern Ireland Labour Party: Supported O'Neill's economic reforms and believed his policies would reduce sectarianism.
Catholic Middle Class: Many professionals and businessmen supported O'Neill, hoping his reforms would reduce discrimination and improve living standards.

Nationalist Party: Initially welcomed O'Neill's initiatives, offering to become the official opposition at Stormont in 1965.

Unionist Opposition: Traditional/Hard-line Unionists: O'Neill's policies, particularly his outreach to Catholics, were seen as a betrayal of traditional Unionist principles. They feared that improving Catholic conditions would lead to calls for a united Ireland.

Lord Brookeborough: Publicly expressed concern over O'Neill's reforms.

Ian Paisley: A fundamentalist Presbyterian minister, Paisley became a vocal and charismatic leader of the opposition, vehemently condemning O'Neill's policies as a sell-out to Catholicism and republicanism. He organized large demonstrations and disrupted O'Neill's meetings.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF): A loyalist paramilitary group, reactivated in 1966, engaged in sectarian murders, targeting Catholics as a warning against O'Neill's policies. O'Neill proscribed the UVF.

Unionist Backbenchers: O'Neill faced significant opposition from within his own party, as many backbench MPs, rooted in traditional Unionist communities, distrusted his liberal approach.

III. The Civil Rights Movement (1964-1969)

Growing Catholic Frustration: Despite O'Neill's reforms, deep-seated grievances remained among Catholics regarding discrimination in housing, employment, and electoral gerrymandering.

Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ, 1964): Founded by Patricia and Con McCluskey, this group meticulously documented and publicized cases of discrimination against Catholics. Unlike traditional nationalist parties, it focused on civil rights and used peaceful, constitutional methods, appealing to British and international opinion.

Homeless Citizens' League (Dungannon, 1963): Established by Austin Currie, this group highlighted the severe housing discrimination in Dungannon, often involving protests like squatting in homes allocated to Protestants.

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA, 1967): Inspired by the American Civil Rights Movement, NICRA was founded to demand: 
  • One person, one vote (ending the restricted local government franchise).
  • End to gerrymandering.
  • End to discrimination in housing and employment.
  • Repeal of the Special Powers Act (allowing internment without trial).
  • Disbandment of the B Specials.
  • Fair public appointments.
Early Marches and Violence: NICRA organized peaceful marches. However, a march in Derry on October 5, 1968, was attacked by the RUC, drawing international media attention and outrage. This event is often seen as the beginning of "The Troubles."

People's Democracy (1968): A student-led civil rights group, inspired by the Derry march, organized a march from Belfast to Derry in January 1969. The marchers were ambushed and attacked by loyalists at Burntollet Bridge, with RUC officers failing to protect them. This further escalated tensions.

British Government's Role: The British government initially preferred not to intervene in Northern Ireland's internal affairs. However, the events of 1968-1969, particularly the violence and international condemnation, forced them to take a more active role. Gerry Fitt, a Republican Labour MP, also raised the issue of discrimination in the British Parliament.

IV. O'Neill's Downfall

Growing Pressure: O'Neill faced increasing pressure from both hard-line Unionists (who saw his reforms as too much) and the Civil Rights Movement (who saw them as too little, too slow).

Resignation: Unable to reconcile these opposing forces and facing a loss of confidence within his own party, O'Neill resigned in April 1969. His resignation marked the end of an era of attempted reform and the beginning of a more turbulent period in Northern Irish history, leading directly into the worst years of the Troubles. The chapter concludes by highlighting that the initiative for change ultimately came from direct action on the streets of Northern Ireland, rather than from political speeches and pamphlets, setting the stage for further confrontation.

Chapter 19:

I. The Formation and Demands of the Civil Rights Association (NICRA)

Foundation: The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was founded in Belfast in January 1967.

Disbandment of the B-Specials: The part-time police force, which NICRA viewed as overwhelmingly Protestant and biased against the nationalist community.

Repeal of the Special Powers Act: This act gave extensive powers to the Northern Ireland Government, including internment without trial and the right to ban demonstrations.

Controversy and Leadership: The civil rights movement was controversial from the outset, though most nationalists strongly identified with its demands. Its leadership largely emerged from a new generation of educated young Catholics, such as John Hume, Austin Currie, Bernadette Devlin, Eamon McCann, and Michael Farrell. Television played a crucial role in bringing the movement's message to a wider audience.

II. The Battle of Burntollet Bridge (January 1969)

Background: Inspired by the RUC's attack on a civil rights march in Derry in October 1968, a student-led group called People's Democracy (PD) organized a four-day march from Belfast to Derry starting on January 1, 1969.

The Ambush: The marchers faced hostility along the way and were ambushed by loyalists, including off-duty B-Specials, at Burntollet Bridge. The RUC, despite being present, failed to protect the marchers, who were savagely beaten.

Impact: The attack, widely reported by international media, further radicalized Catholics and drew condemnation from the British Labour Government. It significantly eroded Catholic trust in the RUC and O'Neill's government. Many saw the RUC's inaction as complicity in the loyalist violence.

III. The Downfall of Terence O'Neill

Growing Pressure: The Burntollet attack intensified pressure on O'Neill.
General Election (February 1969): O'Neill called a snap general election hoping to gain a mandate for his reform policies. However, the election results were inconclusive, and he faced significant opposition from hard-line Unionists (Paisleyites) and an emerging liberal Unionist faction.

Resignation (April 1969): Unable to govern effectively and facing a loss of confidence from within his own party, O'Neill resigned, replaced by his cousin, James Chichester-Clark.

IV. The Apprentice Boys' March and the Battle of the Bogside (August 1969)

Apprentice Boys' March: On August 12, 1969, the annual Apprentice Boys' march, a Protestant loyalist parade commemorating the relief of the Siege of Derry, took place. The parade passed close to the Catholic Bogside area, leading to severe provocation and sectarian taunts.

Start of the Battle: Rioting erupted as stones and petrol bombs were thrown from both sides. The RUC responded by firing tear gas and attempting to enter the Bogside.

Community Defense: The residents of the Bogside, led by the Derry Citizens' Defence Association (DCDA), set up barricades, used petrol bombs, and effectively resisted the RUC for two days. This became known as the Battle of the Bogside.

Police Collapse: The RUC, exhausted and facing overwhelming resistance, eventually collapsed as a policing force in Derry.

V. Rioting in Belfast and the Arrival of British Troops (August 1969)

Belfast Rioting: Sympathy riots erupted in Belfast on August 14, primarily in areas with mixed Protestant and Catholic populations. Loyalists attacked Catholic homes and businesses, leading to sectarian clashes.

Escalation: The RUC's presence often seemed to exacerbate the situation, and there were allegations that the B-Specials sided with loyalist mobs. The rioting resulted in several deaths and widespread destruction of property, particularly in Catholic areas.

Lynch's Intervention: The Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, Jack Lynch, made a televised address on August 13, stating that the Irish government "could not stand by" while people were injured in Northern Ireland. He called for a UN peacekeeping force but made no intention to send Irish troops across the border. His speech angered Protestants while not fully satisfying Catholic expectations.

British Troop Deployment: As the RUC lost control in Derry and the situation in Belfast deteriorated, the Northern Ireland Government of Chichester-Clark had no choice but to request British military assistance. On August 14, 1969, British troops arrived in Derry, replacing the RUC, and were initially welcomed by most Catholics as a protective force.

Turning Point: The deployment of British troops marked a critical turning point, signifying the British Government's direct intervention in Northern Ireland's internal affairs and the beginning of a prolonged military presence that would last for decades. This event marked the beginning of "The Troubles" as a large-scale conflict.

Chapter 20:

I. The British Government's Increased Involvement (Post-August 1969)

Shift in Role: The deployment of British troops in August 1969 significantly altered the security situation in Northern Ireland. Though initially meant to assist the RUC and the Stormont government, their presence inevitably led to greater involvement from the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and his Home Secretary, James Callaghan.

Commitment to Union and Reform: During a meeting in London on August 19 between James Chichester-Clark (Northern Ireland Prime Minister) and Harold Wilson, a joint statement was issued promising equal treatment for all citizens while reaffirming Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom as long as the majority wished.

Callaghan's Visits and Reforms: James Callaghan visited Northern Ireland to assure the population that the British Labour Government was committed to reforms and restoring law and order.

Hunt Report (October 1969): This report recommended disbanding the B-Specials and establishing the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) as a new, locally recruited, part-time force. It also recommended disarming the RUC (who would retain riot shields) and ending the use of plastic bullets. These reforms were a major victory for the Civil Rights Movement, though unionists were outraged.

Cameron Report (September 1969): This report blamed the Stormont government for discrimination and violence.

Housing and Local Government Reforms: The British Government demanded the introduction of proportional representation in local government elections, an end to the company vote (which gave multiple votes to businesses), and the establishment of an impartial Housing Executive to manage public housing.

Police Act (1970): Implemented the Hunt Report's recommendations, including the formation of the UDR and disarming the RUC.
Unionist Response: Unionists were largely angered by the British reforms, seeing them as undermining their authority and identity. Their slogan became "Ulster says No."

II. The Rise of the Provisional IRA

IRA Split (December 1969): The traditional IRA split into two factions:
Official IRA: Favored political action and a socialist approach to achieving a united Ireland.

Provisional IRA (Provos): Advocated for continued armed struggle to force the British out of Northern Ireland. They gained support from many Catholics who felt unprotected after the August 1969 riots and subsequent attacks on Catholic areas. Their support was also fueled by the perceived failure of NICRA to deliver immediate change and the increasingly heavy-handed approach of the British Army.

IRA Tactics: The Provisional IRA launched a bombing campaign against commercial premises in Belfast, aiming to disrupt the economy and force the British withdrawal. They also engaged in sectarian assassinations and ambushes of British soldiers.

III. Escalation of Violence and Internment

Growing Violence (1970-1971): The violence escalated rapidly in the early 1970s.
Falls Curfew (July 1970): British soldiers imposed a three-day curfew on the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast, searching homes for weapons and leading to intense rioting and several deaths. This event alienated many Catholics from the British Army.

Chichester-Clark's Resignation (March 1971): Frustrated by the lack of success against the IRA, Chichester-Clark resigned and was replaced by Brian Faulkner.

Internment (August 1971): Faulkner's government introduced internment without trial, allowing the British Army to arrest and hold suspected paramilitaries.

Impact: Internment was a disastrous policy. Only 100 out of 450 initially interned were actually paramilitaries; the majority were innocent Catholic men. No loyalist paramilitaries were interned. This led to a huge increase in Catholic support for the Provisional IRA and widespread civil disobedience, including the refusal to pay rent and rates. Violence surged, with over 170 people killed in the first five months of internment.

IV. Bloody Sunday (January 30, 1972)

The March: On January 30, 1972, NICRA organized an anti-internment march in Derry.
British Army Action: British paratroopers fired on the unarmed crowd, killing 13 and injuring many more (a 14th victim later died). The British Army claimed they were fired upon first, but this was contradicted by most witnesses.

Impact: Bloody Sunday was a catastrophic event that galvanized nationalist opinion. It led to widespread anger and condemnation, particularly in the Republic of Ireland, where the British Embassy in Dublin was burned. The event also strengthened the Provisional IRA's recruitment and support.

Widgery Tribunal: An official inquiry led by Lord Widgery largely cleared the soldiers, but this report was widely condemned by nationalists as a whitewash.
V. The Fall of Stormont and Direct Rule (March 1972)

Final Stage: Bloody Sunday marked the end of the Unionist-controlled government at Stormont.

Heath's Intervention: On March 24, 1972, British Prime Minister Edward Heath met with Brian Faulkner and his ministers in London. Heath informed them that control of security would be transferred from Stormont to the British Government.

Resignation and Dissolution: When the Northern Ireland government resigned in protest, Heath prorogued (dissolved) the Northern Ireland Parliament for a year and instituted direct rule from London.

End of an Era: The period of Unionist self-rule, which had begun in 1921, came to an end. While nationalists celebrated the fall of Stormont, unionists were outraged and blamed the IRA campaign for the loss of their parliament. The British Government now faced the immediate challenge of ending the violence and the longer-term goal of restoring local power.

Chapter 21:

I. Direct Rule (March 1972)

Imposition: After the fall of the Stormont government, the British Government imposed Direct Rule on Northern Ireland on March 24, 1972.

Key Figure: William Whitelaw was appointed the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. He took control of all government departments and affairs previously managed by Stormont.

Aims of Direct Rule:
  1. Short-term: End the escalating violence.
  2. Long-term: Restore devolved government in Northern Ireland, but on a more stable basis that would ensure power-sharing between nationalists and unionists.

II. British Attempts to End Violence (1972)

Whitelaw's Approach: Whitelaw initially sought to engage with all sides to de-escalate the conflict.

Meeting with Provisional IRA: In July 1972, Whitelaw arranged a secret meeting with the Provisional IRA leadership, including Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. The meeting was a failure, as the IRA demanded an immediate British withdrawal, which was unacceptable to the British Government. The IRA ended its ceasefire shortly after the meeting.

Operation Motorman (July 1972): Following the failure of talks and increased violence, the British Army launched Operation Motorman. This was a massive military operation involving thousands of troops, tanks, and armored cars, aimed at dismantling "no-go areas" (areas controlled by paramilitaries, particularly the Provisional IRA, in Catholic enclaves like the Bogside in Derry and parts of West Belfast). The operation successfully re-established British military control but further alienated the Catholic community.

III. Political Initiatives Towards Power-Sharing

Shift in British Policy: The British Government realized that a purely military solution was insufficient and that a political settlement involving power-sharing was necessary.

Green Paper (October 1972): The British Government published a Green Paper outlining proposals for future governance, including the concept of power-sharing and an "Irish dimension" (involvement of the Republic of Ireland).

White Paper (March 1973): Building on the Green Paper, the White Paper proposed a new Northern Ireland Assembly elected by proportional representation (PR) and a power-sharing executive (cabinet) where both unionists and nationalists would hold ministerial positions. It also included an "Irish Dimension" through a Council of Ireland.

Assembly Elections (June 1973): Elections for the new Northern Ireland Assembly were held using PR, which helped ensure fair representation for minorities.

Sunningdale Agreement (December 1973): This landmark agreement was reached at Sunningdale, England, involving the British Government (Edward Heath), the Republic of Ireland Government (Liam Cosgrave), and the three main power-sharing parties in Northern Ireland:

Key Elements of the Agreement:
Power-Sharing Executive: To be formed with both unionist and nationalist ministers. Brian Faulkner was to be the Chief Executive.
Council of Ireland: An inter-governmental body with seven ministers from the Dáil (Republic of Ireland Parliament) and seven from the Northern Ireland Executive, dealing with cross-border cooperation on issues like tourism and energy.

British Guarantee: A restatement by the British Government that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK as long as the majority wished. The Republic of Ireland also acknowledged this in the agreement, though it did not amend its constitution immediately.

Formation of the Executive: The power-sharing Executive took office on January 1, 1974.

IV. Opposition to Sunningdale and its Collapse

Unionist Opposition: The Sunningdale Agreement faced fierce opposition from various unionist groups:
  1. Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP): Led by William Craig.
  2. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): Led by Ian Paisley.
  3. Loyalist Paramilitaries: Including the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).
Reasons for Unionist Opposition: They viewed the Council of Ireland as a "Trojan horse" leading to a united Ireland and saw power-sharing with nationalists as an unacceptable dilution of their British identity and sovereignty.

Nationalist Opposition: The Provisional IRA also opposed Sunningdale, continuing its bombing campaign, believing that it copper-fastened partition.
Loyalist Political Strike (Ulster Workers' Council Strike, May 1974): The Ulster Workers' Council (UWC), an umbrella group for loyalist paramilitaries and some unionist politicians, organized a general strike to collapse the power-sharing Executive. The strike successfully paralyzed Northern Ireland, shutting down power, transport, and other essential services.

British Government's Inaction: The British Labour Government, now led by Harold Wilson, failed to break the strike and effectively allowed it to succeed.

Collapse of the Executive (May 28, 1974): Brian Faulkner resigned as Chief Executive, leading to the collapse of the power-sharing Executive.

Return to Direct Rule: Direct Rule from London was reimposed, continuing for another 25 years. The failure of Sunningdale led to deepening disillusionment and resentment among both communities, contributing to further instability and violence in Northern Ireland. The chapter concludes by highlighting the British Government's ongoing commitment to finding a political solution despite the setbacks, with a focus on future attempts at power-sharing.

Chapter 22:

I. Political Stalemate (1974-1979)

Return to Direct Rule: After the failure of Sunningdale, direct rule from London was re-established, with Merlyn Rees as the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Labour Government, like its Conservative predecessor, still favored a power-sharing arrangement, but all attempts to restore it failed due to the strong opposition of a majority of unionists and continued paramilitary violence.

Anti-Power-Sharing Unionist Dominance: In the October 1974 British general election, the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), a grouping of anti-power-sharing unionist parties, won 10 out of 12 Northern Ireland seats in the Westminster Parliament, demonstrating the strong unionist rejection of power-sharing.

Constitutional Convention (1975): The British Government set up an elected convention to try and restore power-sharing. However, the anti-power-sharing unionists won 58% of the vote (47 out of 78 seats) in the May 1975 convention election, leading to its inevitable failure. Brian Faulkner's pro-power-sharing unionists secured only 5 seats, Alliance 8, SDLP 17, and the Northern Ireland Labour Party 1.

Economic Problems: This period of political stagnation was also marked by severe economic problems in Northern Ireland, including high unemployment and declining traditional industries.

Thatcher's Government (1979): The election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government in Britain in 1979 brought a new approach. Thatcher, a staunch unionist, believed in a firm stance against terrorism and stated that Northern Ireland's constitutional position was secure, effectively ruling out a united Ireland.

II. The Diplock Courts

Special Powers Act Repealed: The Special Powers Act was repealed in 1973, but it was replaced by new legislation.

Diplock Courts (1973): Following the recommendations of Lord Diplock, the British Government established non-jury "Diplock Courts" to try suspected terrorists. These courts allowed for conviction based solely on the evidence of an RUC superintendent, rather than a jury, which was deemed too susceptible to intimidation. This measure was seen by nationalists as a violation of civil liberties.

III. The "Conveyor Belt" and the "Blanket Protest"

Criminalization: After 1976, the British Government ended "Special Category Status" for prisoners convicted of scheduled (terrorist) offenses. This meant that paramilitary prisoners were now treated as ordinary criminals, losing privileges such as wearing their own clothes, refusing prison work, and associating freely with fellow prisoners. This policy was aimed at "criminalizing" paramilitaries.

"Blanket Protest" (1976): In response to the loss of Special Category Status, republican prisoners (mostly Provisional IRA) at the Maze Prison (Long Kesh) initiated the "Blanket Protest." They refused to wear prison uniforms, instead wrapping themselves in blankets, to protest their classification as criminals.

"Dirty Protest" (1978): When the prisoners' demands were not met, the protest escalated into the "Dirty Protest." Prisoners refused to wash or empty their chamber pots, smearing excrement on their cell walls. Conditions became appalling, leading to international criticism.

IV. The 1981 Hunger Strikes

Demands: Prisoners initiated hunger strikes to regain Special Category Status, demanding the "Five Demands":
  1. The right to wear their own clothes.
  2. The right to abstain from prison work.
  3. The right to free association with other paramilitary prisoners. 
  4. The right to organize their own recreational activities.
  5. The right to 50% remission of their sentences.
First Hunger Strike (October-December 1980): Seven republican prisoners went on hunger strike, but it ended without resolution as the prisoners feared they were about to die, and the British Government offered vague concessions that were later withdrawn.

Second Hunger Strike (March 1981): A second hunger strike began on March 1, 1981, led by Bobby Sands, the IRA's commanding officer in the Maze Prison. This strike was highly organized and generated significant international attention and sympathy for the prisoners' cause.

Bobby Sands' Election: The death of Frank Maguire, the independent nationalist MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, led to a by-election. Sinn Féin decided that Bobby Sands, then on hunger strike for forty days, should contest the seat. Despite unionist opposition, Sands won the election in April 1981 by a margin of 1,446 votes, securing over 30,000 votes.

Thatcher's Unwavering Stance: Sands' election did not sway Margaret Thatcher, who adamantly refused to grant the prisoners political status, stating that "crime is crime is crime."

Deaths of Hunger Strikers: Bobby Sands died on May 5, 1981, after 66 days on hunger strike. His death, and the deaths of nine other hunger strikers over the following months, caused immense anger and rioting in nationalist areas and led to a surge in support for the IRA.

End of the Strikes: The hunger strikes ended in October 1981 when the prisoners' families intervened to prevent more deaths. While the prisoners did not achieve their political status demands, some concessions were granted later.

Consequences of the Hunger Strikes:
Sinn Féin's Rise: The hunger strikes gave Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, a massive propaganda victory. Encouraged by Sands' electoral success, Sinn Féin decided to engage more directly in electoral politics.

"Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy": Sinn Féin adopted a strategy of combining armed struggle with political participation, famously described as "a ballot paper in one hand and an Armalite in the other."

Increased Violence: The deaths of the hunger strikers led to a significant increase in violence throughout Northern Ireland.
Heightened Sectarian Division: The hunger strikes further deepened the divide between nationalists and unionists.

International Pressure on Britain: The international media coverage of the hunger strikes increased pressure on the British Government to find a political solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Gerry Adams' Influence: Gerry Adams' influence within the republican movement grew significantly during this period, leading to a more political direction for Sinn Féin. The chapter highlights that the hunger strikes, despite failing to achieve their explicit aims, became a pivotal moment in the Troubles, fundamentally altering the political landscape and the republican movement's approach.

Chapter 23:

I. The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985)

Background: Despite Margaret Thatcher's initial rejection of the New Ireland Forum Report in 1984, secret talks between the British and Irish governments continued to address the Northern Ireland deadlock.

Signing: The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald at Hillsborough Castle, Co. Down, on November 15, 1985.

Key Feature: Inter-Governmental Conference: The most important aspect of the agreement was the establishment of the Inter-Governmental Conference. This body, co-chaired by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, would meet regularly to discuss cross-border cooperation on various issues. Crucially, it provided an official forum where Irish representatives could voice the grievances of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. A permanent secretariat of civil servants from both North and South was set up at Maryfield.

British and Irish Perspectives:
Thatcher's Aim: Thatcher hoped the agreement would lead to greater security cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic. She believed it strengthened the Union by securing Irish government's acceptance that no change to Northern Ireland's status would occur without the consent of the majority.

FitzGerald's Aim: FitzGerald aimed to improve conditions for nationalists within Northern Ireland, promote cross-border cooperation, and strengthen the constitutional nationalist parties against Sinn Féin. The agreement acknowledged that Northern Ireland's status could only change by consent, a significant concession from the Republic.

Reactions:
Nationalist Support: The SDLP and the Catholic Church largely welcomed the agreement, seeing it as a step towards better treatment for Catholics and a recognition of the "Irish dimension."  
 
Unionist Outrage: Unionists were overwhelmingly outraged. They felt betrayed by Thatcher, who they believed had conceded too much to the Republic. Their main objection was the perceived involvement of the Irish government in Northern Ireland's internal affairs, embodied by the Inter-Governmental Conference. They launched a massive "Ulster Says No" campaign, including protests, strikes, and resignation of all 15 Unionist MPs from Westminster (though most were re-elected in the subsequent by-elections). Loyalist paramilitary violence also increased. 
 
Republican Opposition: The Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin also condemned the agreement, viewing it as reinforcing partition.

II. The Peace Process Begins (Late 1980s - Early 1990s)

Dialogue from the British Government: In 1990, the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, began signaling a new approach. In a speech in November 1990, he stated that Britain had "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland." This was a significant shift, suggesting Britain would not impede Irish unity if a majority in Northern Ireland desired it. He also acknowledged that Sinn Féin had a mandate from nationalist voters.

Hume-Adams Talks (1988-1993): Despite the opposition of the British Government, SDLP leader John Hume engaged in a series of secret talks with Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams. Hume's aim was to persuade Sinn Féin to abandon violence and embrace a political path, believing that a united nationalist front could achieve a solution. The talks lasted five years and were crucial in bringing Sinn Féin towards the peace process.

Unionist and Dublin Government Reactions to Hume-Adams Talks: Unionists strongly condemned the talks, refusing to engage with Sinn Féin due to its links to the IRA. The Irish Government was initially cautious but eventually accepted their importance.

III. Escalation of Violence and the Downing Street Declaration (1993)

Intensified Violence: Despite the burgeoning peace efforts, violence escalated in the early 1990s, particularly in 1993.
IRA Attacks: The IRA continued its campaign, including a major bomb attack on the Shankill Road in Belfast in October 1993, aiming to kill loyalist paramilitary leaders but resulting in the deaths of nine Protestant civilians.
Loyalist Retaliation: Loyalist paramilitaries retaliated with increased sectarian attacks, most notably the Greysteel massacre a week after Shankill, where seven Catholics and one Protestant were killed in a bar. 1993 saw the highest number of deaths in a single month since 1976.
Renewed Political Impetus: The extreme violence convinced both British Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds of the urgent need to intensify efforts for peace.
Downing Street Declaration (December 15, 1993): Major and Reynolds met in Brussels and then issued a joint statement known as the Joint Declaration or the Downing Street Declaration. Key principles included:
  • Consent Principle: Reaffirmed that Northern Ireland's constitutional status would not change without the consent of the majority of its people.
  • Self-Determination: Recognized the right of the people of Ireland, North and South, to self-determination, but only through peaceful and democratic means, and with the consent of both parts of the island.
  • Renunciation of Violence: Called on paramilitaries to renounce violence.
  • Dialogue with Sinn Féin: Offered Sinn Féin a place at the negotiating table if the IRA ended its campaign permanently. 
Impact: The Downing Street Declaration was a significant step forward, providing a framework for future negotiations and laying the groundwork for the IRA ceasefire that would follow in 1994. It addressed both unionist concerns about consent and nationalist aspirations for self-determination.

Chapter 24:

I. The Economy

Crisis and Decline (1970s-1980s): During the height of the Troubles (1970s and 1980s), Northern Ireland's economy entered a prolonged crisis, reversing the progress made in the 1960s. Factories closed, foreign investment plummeted, and industrial employment sharply declined.

Contributing Factors:
  • Global Economic Depression: Worldwide economic downturns, including oil crises, contributed to the decline.
  • Decreased Demand: Reduced demand for traditional products like textiles further impacted industries.
  • Paramilitary Violence: Bombing campaigns by paramilitaries caused widespread damage to commercial property and created an atmosphere of uncertainty, deterring new foreign investment. Between 1966-1971, foreign industries created 11,600 manufacturing jobs, but this dropped to only 900 jobs between 1972-1976.
  • Unemployment: Unemployment rates remained high, with a significant disparity between Catholics and non-Catholics. In 1971, Catholic male unemployment was 17.3% compared to 6.6% for non-Catholics; by 1981, these figures rose to 30.2% and 12.4% respectively, showing persistent discrimination.

II. Religion and Population Change

Religious Composition: The population of Northern Ireland remained roughly two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic.
Catholic Birth Rate: The Catholic population grew slightly faster due to a higher birth rate.
Catholic Emigration: While a high Catholic birth rate led to a larger proportion of young people, emigration rates for Catholics were also higher than for Protestants, particularly during economic downturns, which somewhat balanced the demographic shift.
Sectarian Geography: The Troubles led to increased sectarian segregation in housing, employment, and social life, particularly in Belfast. People tended to live in areas dominated by their own community, which sometimes reinforced existing divisions.

III. Education in a Divided Society

Segregated System: The education system in Northern Ireland remained highly segregated.

Maintained Schools: Almost all Catholic children attended "maintained schools" (Catholic schools), which received some state funding but were largely controlled by the Catholic Church.

Controlled Schools: Almost all Protestant children attended "controlled schools" (state schools), which were publicly funded and effectively managed by local authorities.

Religious Instruction: Religious instruction was compulsory in both types of schools.

Integrated Education: Despite some calls for integrated education, only a tiny minority of children (around 0.2% in 1980) attended integrated schools where both Catholic and Protestant children were educated together.

Impact on Social Cohesion: This segregated education system reinforced sectarian divisions, as most children grew up without significant interaction with those from the other community.
Social Mobility for Catholics: Despite the discrimination, the expansion of the welfare state and increased access to university education (particularly at Queen's University Belfast and the New University of Ulster at Coleraine) provided opportunities for social mobility, especially for the Catholic middle class. This educated Catholic middle class played a key role in the Civil Rights Movement.
IV. The Nationalist Identity

Core Elements: Nationalist identity was primarily based on being Irish and Catholic and supporting a united Ireland.
Pillars of Culture: Key elements of nationalist culture included the Irish language and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA).
Internal Divisions: Nationalist identity also masked deep divisions between those who favored peaceful means to achieve a united Ireland (e.g., SDLP) and those who supported violent republican organizations (e.g., Provisional IRA/Sinn Féin).

V. The Unionist Identity

Core Elements: Unionist identity was rooted in Protestant religion, loyalty to the British Crown, and the connection with Great Britain.
"Siege Mentality": The Troubles reinforced a "siege mentality" among many unionists, who felt constantly under threat from nationalism and republicanism.

Loyal Orders: The most visible expression of unionist identity was through various loyal orders, especially the Orange Order, known for its annual parades. Attempts to curtail Orange marches were seen by unionists as an attack on their cultural identity.
Education and Sport: Protestants typically attended Protestant schools and participated in British sports like rugby, cricket, and soccer, further reinforcing their distinct cultural identity.
VI. Cultural Identities and Reconciliation

Shared and Distinctive Elements: The chapter acknowledges that both cultural identities had distinct and shared elements.
Role of Culture in Peace: In the search for peace and reconciliation, respect for the culture and traditions of both communities became increasingly important.

Writers and Artists: The cultural divide and shared experiences were reflected in the work of writers, musicians, and artists from both traditions, such as Michael Longley and Tom Paulin (unionist tradition) and Seamus Heaney and Brian Friel (nationalist tradition). This chapter underscores the profound impact of the Troubles on Northern Irish society, illustrating how economic hardship, sectarian segregation, and deeply entrenched cultural identities contributed to the conflict while also noting some avenues for social advancement and cultural expression.